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GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION: FRACTIOUS TALKS END IN NO RESULTS

Kuala Lumpur, 1 July (Eqram Mustaqeem) – The adaptation agenda closed on a fractious note as Parties failed to conclude deliberations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), at the recently concluded Bonn climate talks that ended June 18. Parties were unable to reach agreement during this 64th session of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) on the GGA, resulting in the item being forwarded to the next session under Rule 16 of the draft Rules of Procedure.

[Rule 16 provides that "Any item of the agenda of an ordinary session, consideration of which has not been completed at the session, shall be included automatically in the agenda of the next ordinary session, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties."]

The failure to reach an outcome of the GGA agenda came after a series of frustrating impasses that consumed countless hours in the last days of informal consultations, as Parties were deadlocked in terms of how to proceed with the third iteration of the draft text that had reflected strong language on adaptation finance and the principles and provisions of the Convention and its Paris Agreement [PA], including the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances.

After multiple attempts by developing countries, including through the convening of a heads of delegation [HODs] meeting on the final day of the talks by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), to arrive at a positive conclusion on the matter, no agreement was ultimately achieved. In the final two days, the SB Chairs tabled two iterations of draft text in an effort to bridge differences.

The first version of a draft text included a bridging proposal from the SB Chairs reflected as options on the adaptation finance language, and references to equity and CBDR-RC, which developed countries had proclaimed were "extremely uncomfortable" for them.

While developing countries expressed willingness to use this draft text as a basis for negotiations despite the inclusion of weaker language on adaptation finance and the watering down of the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, it was rejected forthright by the developed countries.

A second version of text was introduced less than an hour before the final informal consultation at the final day, presented effectively as a "take it or leave it" text as time run out.

Botswana, for the **African Group**, and **Uruguay** for **Grupo Sur**, requested additional time to consider the proposal. However, this request was not accommodated, as the SB Chairs were due to attend a HOD's meeting to deal with other outstanding issues [on the Mitigation Work Programme and Response Measures].

The final version of the GGA draft text leaned heavier towards the demands of the developed countries by removing the language on equity and CBDR-RC, and watered down the language on adaptation finance and removed the involvement of Parties in the work of the technical task force on the Belem Adaptation Indicators related to the GGA.

As there was no consensus on the final draft text and with time running out, the **African Group**, supported by **Grupo Sur**, suggested that the matter be forwarded to the HOD meeting instead for resolution.

At the HOD meeting, according to sources, the Vice-Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) **Carol Franco [Dominican Republic]** asked if Parties could accept the GGA draft text as is, since there was no further time available to discuss and open it. However, the **African Group** underlined that some elements it had been raising were missing in the text and proposed wordings to be added [as regards the work of the technical task force on the Belem Adaptation Indicators (BAI)].

The **SBI Chair Julia Gardiner** made clear that there was no time to open the text to which the **African Group** responded that it could not take the draft text as is. The **African Group's** stance was supported by the **Arab Group**, **South Africa**, the **Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC)** and **Egypt**, while the **European Union (EU)**, **Canada**, **Norway**, the **United Kingdom (UK)**, and the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)** were opposed to the changes proposed. The SBSTA Vice-Chair then announced that because there were objections, there is "no way forward" on the GGA text, thus, inviting the application of Rule 16 of the UNFCCC's Rules of Procedure.

This update will highlight the substantial points of contention between Parties under the GGA agenda item, including disagreements over adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC, the Baku Adaptation Road Map (BAR), and the composition of the technical task force, as well as how these divergences evolved over and ultimately prevented consensus at SB64.

MANDATES UNDER THE GGA

Parties arrived at SB64 with clear expectations of the tasks ahead. At the first informal consultation on 10 June, the co-facilitators, **Ricardo Marshall (Barbados)** and **Peter Gerard Wittoeck (Belgium)**, outlined the mandates as established under decision 12/CMA.7. Parties were invited to consider a set of matters under the GGA agenda item as follows:-

- The Belém–Addis vision on adaptation (BAV), which comprises a two-year policy alignment process by Parties based on the experience, and the technical work referred to below, aimed at developing guidance for operationalising the BAI under the vision.

- Undertake technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the BAI, to be considered at CMA 9 [in 2027], including by establishing a technical task force to contribute to that work.

- The first phase of the BAR, covering 2026–2028, shall focus on initial implementation of activities under the Road Map, consisting of the organization of two workshops per year convened by the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies with the support of the secretariat, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat, aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2.1 (a) of the Paris Agreement [PA] (which relates to the temperature goal).

- The Subsidiary Bodies will develop and agree in 2026–2027 the terms of reference (TOR) for the review of the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which will include the review of the BAI.

Clear divergences emerged between developed and developing countries across each element of work. These divergences were further triggered by the inclusion of language on adaptation finance in iterations of the draft text, introduced following persistent calls from developing countries from the very start of informal consultations. While this language was seen by many developing countries as essential to meaningful adaptation implementation, it proved contentious for developed countries.

Ultimately, disagreements over adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC and the reluctance of developed countries to engage with such language became a central factor in the breakdown of the GGA negotiations.

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OPPOSE REFERENCES TO ADAPTATION FINANCE, EQUITY AND CBDR-RC

Throughout the discussions, developing countries consistently emphasised the need to include explicit language on the tripling of adaptation finance and on the delivery of adequate, predictable, and accessible support for finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building from developed to developing countries, in line with Article 9.1, 10 and 11 of the PA.

Sri Lanka, speaking on behalf of the **G77 and China**, raised these points early on, with strong and continued support from **Botswana** for the **African Group**, the **Dominican Republic** for the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**, **Sudan** for the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, **Chile** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), China** for the **LMDC,** and **Saudi Arabia** for the **Arab Group**.

The absence of such language in the first and second iterations of the draft text was viewed by developing country groups as a significant omission requiring correction. In an attempt to rectify the omission, when language on equity, CBDR-RC and adaptation were finally added they were reflected only as bracketed paras which reads as follows **-**

1. [The SBSTA and the SBI agreed that all work undertaken under the global goal on adaptation shall be implemented in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.]

5. The SBSTA and the SBI further recalled Article 9, paragraph 1, Article 10 and Article 11 of the Paris Agreement, welcomed the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 and emphasized the importance of means of implementation for developing country Parties for achieving the global goal on adaptation, including under the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience.

6. [The SBSTA and the SBI urge the full and urgent delivery of this call to increase the trajectory, as referred to in paragraph 34 of decision 12/CMA.7, dedicated support for achieving the global goal on adaptation and implementing the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience, including the targets thereunder; and efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability in tracking adaptation finance commitments; regularly assess support provided, including under the work programme on climate finance referred to in paragraph 54 of decision 1/CMA.7; and increase the provision of predictable, grant-based, accessible and country-driven finance for developing countries.]

In the informal consultations on 15 June, in response to the new text, **Sri Lanka** for the **G77/China** stated that the provision of means of implementation (MoI) to developing countries from developed countries is based on the Convention and thus should not be negotiable adding further that this is what the group has seen being attempted across all agenda items and wants to put it across firmly and clearly that any attempts to renegotiate the Convention provisions especially with respect to MoI is creating distrust within the process. The group requested that the brackets in paras 1 and 6 in particular be removed. Other developing country sub-groups reflected similar views.

The **EU** expressed serious concerns and disappointment with the text and requested that there be no text options for the adaptation finance language reflected in paras 5 and 6, which was supported by **Canada**, **Switzerland** and the **UK**. **Japan** went a step further by suggesting that there should be no text options for also para 1 [where the principle of equity and CBDR-RC is reflected] in addition to paras 5 and 6.

It was due to this insistence by developed countries on no-text options that progress on the GGA came to a halt. They did not want discussions to proceed on the text until their no-text options were reflected. Developed countries continued on this position until the very last informal consultations which saw a "take it or leave it" text with watered down language on those paras in particular.

India's intervention best captured the vibe of the room, calling the developed countries stance as "coercion", with "creating conditions where issues become more difficult."

In an attempt to salvage the discussions and make progress, the Co-facilitators proposed that the brackets in paras 1 and 6 be removed, with the agreement that the entire text from start till end is bracketed, and if Parties object to this, then they would have to refer the matter to the SB Chairs for further guidance.

In direct reply, the **EU** disagreed with the way forward proposed by the Co-facilitators and requested that the matter be brought directly to the SB Chairs. Consequently, two informal consultations were held on 17 June (just one day before the closing of the SBs), with direct facilitation by the SB Chairs.

In the informal consultations on 17 June, the **Subsidiary Body for Implementation [SBI] Chair Julia Gardiner** opened the meeting saying that there is a solid text here encompassing the BAR, BAV and TOR of the review of the UAE Framework. She said further that to have an outcome out of this session, it is critical to refer to the tripling of adaptation finance decision from Belem and that it has to appear in some shape or form. She further added that the current issue is that the form of the language is not acceptable to all Parties. Gardiner then indicated that both the Chairs of the SBs will conduct bilateral meetings with Parties to understand the issues on the contested paras to find a way forward that is acceptable to all.

Sri Lanka for the **G77 and China** stated that in order to engage with the text, there is the procedural matter that needs to be addressed which is the removal of the brackets in paras 1 and 6 in particular. The **EU** on the other hand shifted its position between calling for the inclusion of no-text options for the contested paras and for narrowing the focus solely to the task force for the BAI text, while side lining discussion on other elements of the text. This flip flop approach, supported by the **UK**, **Canada** and **Japan**, consumed much of the time of the informal consultations, effectively hindering substantive progress.

During the second informal consultations held on the same day, the SB Chairs introduced a new draft text in an effort to break the deadlock. This version built on the third iteration of the draft and included options in paras 1, 5, 6, 22, and 23 as bridging proposals, many of which reflected previously agreed language. The SB Chairs proposed that the text could serve as the basis for discussions in an 'informal-informal' setting to allow work to progress. They also cautioned that if no agreement was reached by the following day, the process would likely result in either procedural conclusions or recourse to Rule 16.

Developing countries, in unison, acknowledged that the text represented a significant compromise on their part. It introduced options around key elements they had consistently advocated for since the first informal consultation, particularly language on adaptation finance, equity and CBDR-RC. Despite these concessions, they expressed willingness to use the text as a basis for further discussions in the informal-informal setting.

Saudi Arabia for the **Arab Group,** stressed that for them rule 16 is not an option and that it is willing to work constructively and stay until midnight if necessary. **China** for the **LMDC,** indicated their willingness to engage and use the text as the basis. The group however stressed that the discussions should cover all parts of the text instead of just singling out parts of the text on just the task force [for the BAI] issue. **Botswana** for the **African Group** emphasised that in the spirit of constructive engagement, the group would go ahead with the suggestion and that Rule 16 is not an option. The same spirit was reflected by all other G77 subgroups with the salient point that discussions must look at the whole text and not just focus specifically on paras pertaining to the task force.

On the flipside, developed countries, instead of building on the proposal by the SB Chairs or reciprocating the flexibility and compromise shown by developing countries, doubled down on their positions, not showing much concern of the possibility of inviting Rule 16 or the lack of progress made at SB64.

Norway suggested that Parties only focus on paras relating to the task force, and drop all the other paras or insert no-text options in them which includes paragraph 1,5,6 and from 21 to 34, (the latter encompassing texts related to the BAR and the TOR). The suggestion to either drop all other parts of the text or include no text options was supported by the **EU** and the **UK.**

China for the **LMDC** responded by pointing out that singling out paras on the task force as the easiest start for progress did not make sense, as the other earlier paras of contention are all by themselves agreed language with options themselves, that also reflect agreed language which makes it even easier for Parties to reach agreement.

This led to another round of informal consultations with no progress made as developed countries did not budge on their position. This impasse and blocking of progress by developed countries prevented Parties from actually deliberating on matters which consequently led to the rule 16 of the GGA agenda.

DIVERGENCES ON THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE BELEM-ADDIS VISION ON ADAPTATION

Operationalisation of the BAV, particularly on determining the composition of the task force undertaking the work, was by itself the biggest issue between developed and developing countries under the GGA. The only major point of agreement between Parties was on the mandate of the task force itself, which is to continue technical work on the indicators by improving metadata and methodologies and timeline of work of the task force itself.

However, on the composition of the task force in particular, there were markedly different views from the outset. A common thread across proposals from developing countries was the inclusion of varying degrees of involvement and/or oversight by Parties in the task force work. This stood in sharp contrast to the position of developed countries, who advocated for a model that excluded Parties entirely from the task force, limiting their role to reviewing outputs during the SB and CMA sessions.

The proposal to exclude Parties drew significant criticism from developing countries, who viewed it as a continuation of the expert-driven approach adopted under the UAE–Belém Work Programme (UBWP) for the development of the indicators. That process had produced a set of indicators that many Parties found unsatisfactory, reinforcing concerns about limited or zero Party involvement and oversight.

Notedly, there were smaller, more minor differences between Parties that were amicable and bridgeable such as the role of constituted bodies, expert pool from the UBWP, independent experts and United Nations (UN) agencies.

In the first round of interventions pertaining to the task force on 11 June, **Sri Lanka** for the **G77 and China** stated that on composition of the taskforce, the group sees value in a manageable and workable arrangement that also ensures Party oversight, and brings in the necessary expertise, with the participation of relevant constituted bodies.

Further, **China** for the **LMDC**, emphasized the fundamental importance of full Party participation and strong Party oversight in the work of the task force. The group stressed that the process must remain non-prescriptive, Party-driven, and tailored to national circumstances, guided by the principle of CBDR-RC and be centred on the needs of Parties, with official Party submissions serving as the primary and most authoritative inputs.

Saudi Arabia for the **Arab Group** stated that the Adaptation Committee (AC), in collaboration with the Least Developed Countries Expert Group [LEG], Consultative Group of Experts [CGE], and the Standing Committee on Finance [SCF], should undertake the technical work on methodologies, guided by the provisions of the Convention and the PA, as well as the safeguards outlined in decision 12/CMA.7, including its non-prescriptive nature.

It said further that the resulting technical report from the AC should take into account national circumstances, data availability, and capacity constraints, including metadata associated with the indicators. It should also address methodologies for indicator application, as well as information on data availability and means of implementation needs. It should include a Party-led policy alignment process, composed of representatives nominated by regional groups with equitable geographical representation, who would then review and refine these technical outputs before their incorporation into a final knowledge product for consideration at SB66. The group made clear that it did not support outsourcing the work to international organizations or experts from the UBWP, emphasizing instead that the work should be undertaken by constituted bodies.

Botswana for the **African Group** emphasised that the BAV should comprise both a technical and a political track. The technical track would focus on advancing work on metadata and methodologies through a Party-driven process, while the political track would centre on policy alignment, including assessing whether the indicators are fit for purpose.

On the technical track, the group expressed support for establishing a task force to carry out work on metadata, with clear outputs, timelines, and modalities. Regarding its composition, the group stressed that the task force should be Party-led while maintaining technical rigour. It proposed a structure comprising both Party representatives and experts, chaired by Parties, with nominations based on UN regional groupings. It further underscored that a smaller, Party-led body would be more effective, while remaining responsive to Party guidance. It should include participation from relevant constituted bodies and processes, while engagement from other stakeholders would be invited on a needs' basis.

Uruguay for **Grupo Sur**, said the composition of the task force needs balanced representation between developed and developing countries in line with UNFCCC constituencies, alongside participation from observer constituencies. Representatives from constituted bodies were highlighted as important contributors to the technical work. The proposal also underscored the role of experts convened by the SB Chairs, drawing from the experts pool established under the UBWP, while ensuring balanced representation across thematic areas, regions, and gender. It further stressed the importance of involving international governmental organizations that serve as custodians of specific indicators, maintaining openness to observer participation.

Chile for **AILAC** emphasized the need for a balanced composition of the task force, drawing from the UBWP experts while ensuring equitable representation between developed and developing countries. It also highlighted the importance of contributions from constituted bodies, as well as participation from intergovernmental organizations and representatives of UNFCCC observer constituencies. The group further stressed the need for modalities that ensure continuous interaction between the technical and political processes. In this regard, it underscored that the task force should not operate in isolation, but rather inform negotiations under the GGA agenda item, while remaining responsive to political guidance that shapes its priorities.

Dominican Republic for **AOSIS** highlighted the BAV should comprise of two interlinked workstreams, a policy alignment track and a technical track focused on improving the metadata and methodologies of the indicators. These workstreams are not intended to operate in isolation and must inform one another throughout the process. Policy alignment was described as a means of strengthening coherence across the broader adaptation architecture, ensuring that the indicators, UAE Framework targets, and NAPs work together to support effective implementation by Parties. On the task force, flexibility in its design was expressed and the involvement of constituted bodies was underscored, as well as the importance of drawing on the expertise of the UBWP experts. The group stated that while the task force's work is inherently technical, it should remain anchored in a Party-driven process. Continuous feedback from the policy alignment track is essential, with voluntary Party inputs, testing, and national experiences feeding into the task force to ensure both policy relevance and technical soundness.

Sudan for the **LDCs** also outlined that the BAV should operate through a technical track and a policy alignment track. Under the technical track, it supported the establishment of a task force comprising representatives from the constituted bodies, while drawing, as needed, on external expertise, including relevant international organizations. The group further proposed that the task force publish periodic updates, with all outputs made accessible through an indicator repository maintained by the secretariat.

The **UK** emphasized that the task force should be composed of self-nominated and impartial experts, underscoring the need to maintain the process as technical in nature. It highlighted the importance of drawing from the UBWP experts to preserve institutional memory. The task force should maintain cohesive and sufficient representation across thematic areas, while also being inclusive of cross-cutting considerations such as gender, human rights, Indigenous Peoples, and local perspectives.

The **EU** proposed that the task force would be convened by the SB Chairs, with support from the UNFCCC secretariat and the UN Statistics Division, and would elect two co-chairs drawn from relevant UN agencies. In terms of composition, the task force would consist of 16 members from UN agencies, with due consideration for gender balance. To ensure transparency, the SB Chairs could organize two virtual exchanges with the co-chairs of constituted bodies. Progress would be reported at SB65 and SB66. Under this proposal, the task force would not include Party representatives or members of constituted bodies, and would instead be composed exclusively of experts from international agencies.

Canada emphasized that the nature of the mandate calls for a technically driven task force composed of experts serving in their individual capacities. It suggested a structure of no more than 20 self-nominated technical experts, with due consideration for regional and gender balance. It supported engagement with relevant UN agencies and constituted bodies, while also underscoring the importance of reflecting Indigenous Peoples' perspectives in the work. However, it did not support direct Party representation in the task force, noting that Parties are already represented in a balanced manner within constituted bodies.

The interventions by Parties on the composition of the task force were compiled and reflected as different options in the draft text. Parties deliberated on these options during the informal consultations held on 15 June, which ultimately proved to be the first and only opportunity for substantive discussion, as progress was subsequently stalled. It became evident that Parties required more time, given the wide divergence in views across groups on the appropriate composition of the task force, and the need for further engagement to bridge these differences.

A BAKU ADAPTATION ROADMAP WITH OR WITHOUT OUTPUTS?

At the outset in the informal consultation on 11 June, developed countries made it clear that they just want the BAR, together with its workshops to only be talk-shops with no outputs whilst also trying their best to not have the BAR be guided as per the mandate has been agreed in para 28 of Decision 12/CMA7.

[Para 28 is as follows;
28. Recalls paragraph 29 of decision 3/CMA.6 and decides that the work under the Baku Adaptation Road Map shall be guided by the following:

(a) Aligning adaptation action with adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, ensuring that national and global adaptation strategies and actions reflect the risks and needs arising from different warming increments within the temperature goal;

(b) Strengthening implementation of the targets outlined in paragraphs 9–10 of decision 2/CMA.5;

(c) Enhancing knowledge-sharing;

(d) Ensuring access to means of implementation for adaptation, for adequate, predictable and accessible financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support, including from developed country Parties to developing country Parties, in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, and Articles 10–11, of the Paris Agreement;]

The interventions made by Parties on the informal consultation on 11 June captured below reflects Parties views on the BAR and illustrates the clear divergences between developed and developing country Parties.

Saudi Arabia for the **Arab Group** provided a detailed intervention on the BAR and stated that all work on the BAR should be anchored under the four pillars of para 28 of decision 12/CMA.7 that are guiding the roadmap and all associated outputs must integrate such pillars. The group suggested that Parties can submit views on each workshop, with the secretariat to provide synthesis and issue the concept note 6 weeks in advance and provide summary report after each workshop including the first workshop and they should be considered by Parties under the following SB and CMA sessions. The first phase of the BAR (2026 - 2028) should conclude with a synthesis report integrating the outcomes of all workshops, technical papers and related activities.

For the group, the BAR should deliver the outcome on temperature responsive adaptation action, and its value lies in determining whether adaptation responses are keeping pace with evolving risk, impacts and needs of increasing temperatures.

China for the **LMDC** emphasised that all work under the BAR should be structured strictly under the same para 28 12/CMA.7. Therefore, any discussions on MoI must be in line with paragraph 28(d) of the same decision and provision of support is the pre-requisite for adaptation implementation and identifying gaps and barriers for adaptation action in developing countries.

On the BAR modalities, there needs to be a clear process with outcomes to be considered by Parties. The group requested that summary reports be published after each workshop to ensure views of all parties are preserved and be up for consideration by Parties in following SB and CMA sessions. The output of the 1st phase of the BAR (2026 - 2028) should be in a consolidated synthesis report taking into account the workshop summary report, concept note of workshop and submissions of views of Parties on the workshop topic which at the end will be up for consideration by Parties.

Chile for **AILAC** said that the BAR should support developing countries in assessing MoI, identify practical tools for adaptation implementation, whilst respecting the country driven nature of adaptation. MoI in particular finance should be the essential standing element of the BAR, ensuring regular consideration that will result in tangible adaptation outcomes on the ground. The group requested that concrete outputs be produced from the workshops that should inform Parties work under the BAR.

Botswana for the **African Group** emphasised that para 28(d) of decision 12/CMA.7 and the reading of MoI within the context of this pillar must anchor the work under the BAR and across the GGA. It must centre MoI at its core and retain its ambition for it. For the BAR workshops in particular, the group maintained that the preparation of summary reports and an annual progress report is important, with a final consolidated synthesis report consolidating key outcomes and activities at the end of BAR phase 1 (2026 - 2028). Prior to each of the workshops, Parties should be given the opportunity to provide submissions on their views, submission by Parties should then be compiled and be up for consideration by at each session.

Dominican Republic for **AOSIS** expressed that the BAR should be a space to track implementation of UAE Framework, discuss MoI and function as a science to policy bridge, while **Sudan** for the **LDCs** emphasised the importance of having reports from the workshops.

The developed countries however did not see such ambition for the BAR, dismissing any need for MoI discussions, suggesting that there shall be no outputs. When the iterations of draft text were published, developed countries made strong preference that there shall be no text altogether for the BAR.

The **UK** expressed that the BAR can hold workshops but they should not be parallel negotiations and the BAR should not be a finance tracking mechanism or duplicate work of the SCF. **Canada** stated that the mandate on the BAR comes from paragraph 26 to 29 of decision 12/CMA.7 read together with paragraph 38 2/CMA.5, thus there is no scope to review or extend the mandate at this stage. To them this means that there is no mandate to produce workshop reports. **Japan** said that the BAR is a non-negotiating process and thus shall not provide inputs into negotiated items. On MoI, the BAR should not focus on finance as the core area of work as discussions on finance should be in an already existing and dedicated track and processes that should not be duplicated.

In the next few iterations of text until the last, the BAR work was be reflected with two options: one that captured the views that have been expressed by Parties, particularly of developing countries and another is the no text option. Developing countries leaned towards the former whilst their developed counterparts on the latter, stating that there is already an agreed, existing mandate and thus, should not be extended further.

Saudi Arabia for the **Arab Group** in its response stated that the exclusion of any text on the BAR is entirely unacceptable. Any outcome that falls short of delivering clear and meaningful outcomes for the BAR is not an option and asked for the no text option to be omitted. It affirmed that they do not accept the misinterpretation of the mandate under the BAR and that all work under the BAR must be anchored in and guided by para 28 and para 29 of decision 12/CMA.7.

Clearly, Antalya will see similar wrangles between developed and developing countries.